On EVE and NII
BSP
requires banks to calculate and disclose PV-based economic value effects
alongside measures for earnings volatility according to banks’ internal
measurement system (IMS). The two perspectives of IRRBB management are
complementary, because of their differences in terms of outcomes, assessment
horizons and balance sheet assumptions.
ΔEVE
is defined as the maximum change in the present value of interest-bearing
assets, liabilities (excluding capital), and off-balance sheet items in a
wide-range interest rate shocks.
ΔNII
is the adverse change in net interest income over a specific time-horizon (12
months) against specific scenarios such as gradual parallel 200 bps shock
scenarios. This metric aims to identify earnings volatility and needs to be
calculated especially by more complex banks on a dynamic balance sheet approach
(e.g Circular #1044 page 7). A dynamic approach “incorporates future business expectations, adjusted for the relevant
scenario in a consistent manner”.
In
my view, banks need a full-blown balance sheet simulation, where changes in the
customer behaviour, volumes and margins are fully rate dependent to
comply with the guideline. Minimum norm is set to rise as well, for behavioural modelling, scenario analysis and validation processes as
well as their integration into the IRRBB risk appetite and monitoring
frameworks.
The
greater supervisory expectation is not only a burden, but it is also an opportunity
for banks to optimize their ALM strategy. For example, more robust modelling
of non-maturity deposits (NMD) might reveal that the duration of NMDs is longer
than currently assumed. As a result, more long-dated fixed-rate loans can be
added, and thus greater interest revenues without incurring additional tenor mismatch
risks.
Comparison with the Basel
IRRBB Standards (BCBS 368)
The
BSP Circular #1044 is in line with the Basel guideline for the IMS to measure
and report banks’ IRRBB exposure, in particular on risk governance
aspects and disclosure requirements. However, BSP does not offer the Basel Standardized approach that can be used by banks as their IMS.
Another key distinguishing feature of the BSP Circular is the absence of supervisory outlier tests as an integral part of banks’ internal framework for the
management of IRRBB. A
supervisory outlier test aims to
identify banks with undue risk-taking in terms of ΔEVE based on specific
interest rate scenarios such as the six rate scenario shocks prescribed in the
BCBS 368. This tool is also useful for external stakeholders to gauge IRRBB exposures in the industry on a more comparable basis.
Similarities
and differences of the BSP Circular #1044 and the BCBS 368 are summarized in
the following exhibit.
I don't have insights into why the standardized framework is removed. Perhaps it is to avoid undue compliance burden for (smaller) banks...
In anyhow, its absence should compel banks to be thoughtful about their balance sheet assumptions, scenario developments, behavioural modelling and aggregation of calculation results by significant currencies. As a consequence, implementation of the Circular would likely be less box-ticking exercise for Philippine banks compared to banks that are only required to adopt the standardized approach.
In anyhow, its absence should compel banks to be thoughtful about their balance sheet assumptions, scenario developments, behavioural modelling and aggregation of calculation results by significant currencies. As a consequence, implementation of the Circular would likely be less box-ticking exercise for Philippine banks compared to banks that are only required to adopt the standardized approach.
ALM strategy under the BSP
Framework
How
will BSP Circular #1044 affect the field of ALM in the Philippines?
The
new guideline on IRRBB would not act as a constraint on the risk-taking and
revenue-generating part of IRRBB. But a good implementation can avoid the bank
from facing supervisory enforcement actions (page 13):
“…the Bangko Sentral may deploy
enforcement actions to promote adherence with the requirements set forth in
these guidelines and bring about timely corrective actions. lf a bank's/QB's
risk exposures are not well-managed, the Bangko Sentral may direct the
bank/QB to increase its capital, reduce its IRRBB exposures and/or strengthen
its risk management system.”
Furthermore,
the IRRBB framework is a clear catalyst for implementing more robust dynamic
ALM and stress scenario analysis that could unveil concentration risks and sub-optimal
balance sheet strategy. Based on the ensuing dynamics of margins, maturity
preferences of clients and their effect onto the tenor mismatch, and other
factors, a strategy for the tenor mismatch can have objectives ranging from
boosting NII to stabilizing it over a future rates cycle. The dynamic balance
sheet approach makes ALM exciting but, more importantly, a necessity for future
profitability.
Concluding Remarks
Despite
the absence of the requirement to measure IRRBB exposures according to the
Basel standardized approach (BCBS 368) as a fallback or alternative, the implementation
of the BSP guideline is set to influence both ALM practices and supervisory priorities.
In
particular, the BSP Circular #1044 is expected to bring about significant
changes to IRRBB modelling in banks with respect to both behavioural option risks
and embedded automatic option risks.
For
more complex or larger institutions, the new guideline also requires a robust
or enhanced ALM platform. This is because thorough balance sheet simulations
based on granular data are a prerequisite for many of the qualitative aspects
of the BSP requirements. Capability to implement the dynamic balance sheet
approach will also strengthen actual management of IRRBB and the tenor mismatch
strategies devised to manage NII over a rate cycle.
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